Hong Kong, October 1 (ANI): Conventional wisdom has long said that signs of a Chinese military build-up – such as deploying masses of troops, assets and vessels to areas near the coast opposite Taiwan – would be impossible to hide. However, what if China could stealthily make such preparations and conduct a sudden strike against Taiwan before it or the USA realized?
Is such a thing possible?
Dennis Blasko, a prominent expert on the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), told ANI, “For any amphibious or air assault of Taiwan, there would be obvious movements and concentrations of troops, vessels and aircraft to give warning time.” Yet Blasko also pointed out: “On the other hand, if they wanted to do a bolt from the blue, they’ve got rocket forces that could fire from their garrisons or areas very close by. They could attack Taiwan with rocket fire, missile fire and air attack if they just wanted to punish… But the big invasion, whether it be by air or sea, that’s going to take the movement of a lot of folks over a lot of time.”
A PLA Daily article stated that all PLA officers are expected to be tactically adroit, operationally aggressive and unflinchingly loyal to Chairman Xi Jinping. However, it asserted that the most important ingredient for command genius is guile. Commanders must have the acumen to deceive and surprise the enemy. Again, it can be asked, does China have the ability to trick both Taiwan and the USA as to its intentions?
Ian Easton, an American associate professor at the China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI), part of the US Naval War College, has pondered China’s potential to conduct a surprise invasion of Taiwan. He presented his findings in a CMSI report published in September 2025 entitled Foggy with a Chance of Surprise Attack: PLA Amphibious Deception in a Taiwan Scenario.
In his study, Easton cited the PLA’s only amphibious invasion, which occurred on 18 January 1955. On that occasion, the PLA made a surprise attack on the Yijiangshan Islands 15km off the coast of Taizhou. At that time the two rocky outcrops were in the hands of Taiwan, and were the country’s northernmost territories. Within ten hours, a PLA invasion force had wiped out or captured the entire garrison of 1,086 defenders for the cost of only 393 casualties.
According to official Chinese histories, the stunning victory was due to the leadership of General Zhang Aiping and his use of deception, hitting the enemy where they least expected it.
Easton also reported: “In 2019, a historian at China’s Academy of Military Sciences, Qu Baolin, penned an award-winning essay in which he argued that there were many lessons the PLA should draw from the Battle of Yijiangshan. ‘The effective concealment of our operational intentions and the realization of sudden and rapid landings are prerequisites in the struggle for victory in joint landing operations,’ he wrote. Qu noted that the PLA’s invasion of Yijiangshan involved simultaneous assaults on an extraordinarily large number of beaches, a move that surprised and overwhelmed the defenders. He asserted that in future operations, the PLA should target coastal areas the defenders do not anticipate having to defend and have not fortified with mines and obstacles, conditions that could allow for rapid assaults and the intensification of surprise.”
Clearly, Xi would love to capture Taiwan, for it would cement his legacy in the pantheon of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) greats. In fact, he would even eclipse Mao Zedong, for China’s first paramount leader was unable to conquer Taiwan.
In March this year, Taiwanese Minister of National Defense acknowledged that the PLA was improving its capabilities for a rapid invasion, raising the possibility that China could orchestrate a sudden assault under the cover of a military exercise, and land on Taiwan with little advanced warning. Admiral Samuel Paparo, head of the US Indo-Pacific Command, concurred: “We’re very close to that where, on a daily basis, the fig leaf of an exercise could very well hide operational warning…Their aggressive maneuvers around Taiwan right now are not exercises as they call them, they’re rehearsals. They’re rehearsals for the forced unification of Taiwan to the mainland.”
Easton commented, “While the PLA would likely suffer disastrous losses in a set-piece battle, a surprise attack could radically enhance its offensive power.” This was demonstrated in the Allied landings in Normandy on D-Day on 6 June 1944, when the Germans were deceived as to the location and date of the invasion.
It is perhaps paradoxical that amphibious assaults and invasions are the most difficult to conduct successfully, but modern history shows they are practically all successful despite the difficulties. Easton remarked, “A critical factor that may explain this apparent historical contradiction is the shock these operations cause, and that is often enhanced by deception. Indeed, amphibious warfare places a special premium on surprise, and normally obtains it.”
General Zhang Youming of the PLA argued in a Chinese report that one of the most powerful weapons any amphibious commander has is deception, including the time and location, and perhaps even manipulating the existence of Beijing’s intention to attack. “Land at times they won’t expect, in places they won’t expect, and from directions they won’t expect. Use combat methods they won’t expect. Land at depths they won’t expect. Hit the enemy suddenly,” Zhang recommended.
Easton therefore observed, “Deception and surprise are of special importance for the PLA in the case of a Taiwan invasion because of the defenders’ ability, if alerted early enough, to mine coastal waters, emplace dense obstacle arrays along the shore, and disperse combat units into tunnels and urban areas. Taiwan’s leaders could be hidden in safe houses or deeply buried bunker complexes. They could then launch missiles and suicide drones at vulnerable amphibious ships, mobilize a large ground force for a protracted fight on favorable defensive terrain, and hold out for reinforcements to arrive from the United States.”
Yet Taiwan currently relies upon early warning of such an attack so it can mobilize sufficiently. Nor has Taiwan fortified its most likely invasion beaches, so it would take time to prepare them. “Taiwan lacks a highly trained reserve force and does not have a territorial defense force or system of armed militias that could mount an organized defense of their hometowns. If either Taiwan’s intelligence or its president’s discernment failed, the nation would risk being invaded and occupied by the PLA before the United States could take decisive countervailing steps,” Easton warned.
The academic continued in his CMSI assessment: “On the other hand, if alerted early enough, Taiwan could take steps to deter, delay or defeat an invasion and weather a protracted blockade with US and allied assistance.”
Easton also quoted Major Korey Lantes of the US Air Force. “Indications and warning enabled by persistent overhead coverage practically render operational surprise impossible. The massing of forces is guaranteed to be noticed by nations worldwide, complicating PRC efforts to achieve the element of surprise.” However, Easton cautioned, “It is not a foregone conclusion that surprise is unachievable …Thus, planners should consider the unique ways the PLA will attempt to achieve the element of surprise and plan against those courses of action.”
There is no doubt the PLA is deceptive. The Chinese military’s textbook, Coursebook on Information Operations in Joint Campaigns, outlines a latticework of deception to defeat Taiwan’s early-warning apparatus and to paralyze every command level. In fact, the PLA is believed to have adopted what is termed “information deception methodology,” which encompasses deception by concealment, confusion and inducement.
Deception by concealment aims to blind and deafen the enemy. The PLA would prevent Taiwan from obtaining information, and will encrypt and conceal all its own communications. As for deception by confusion, the goal is to overwhelm and paralyze the victim’s ability to make decisions. This involves creating clutter and noise, and giving patently false signals, which Taiwan must waste time wading through. Taipei would have to spread its forces thinly to deal with any contingency, delaying the moment of true realization as late as possible. The final one, deception by inducement, seeks to feed victims highly credible but fake information. This would distort Taiwan’s sense of reality and make it ignore or doubt the good intelligence it has. Naturally, it would push Taiwan into making poor decisions.
Practical examples of deception, as listed in the Coursebook on Information Operations in Joint Campaigns, include decoys, camouflage netting, counter-radar reflectors, electronic feints that establish ghost armies, cyberattacks, and fake troop movements and command posts. Easton said in his report: “Available sources that appear to be indicative of doctrine suggest the PLA believes it would execute a powerful blinding campaign against Taiwan before launching the cross-strait invasion. Overwhelming cyber and electronic warfare attacks would be used to create political, economic and financial chaos. The PLA would launch heavy missile and air strikes at the outset of the operation to rapidly obtain control over the cross-strait electromagnetic spectrum, the air and the sea domains. Their objective would be to destroy Taiwan’s leadership, command-and-control systems and significant components of its ground force within a short window of time. Attacks would be accompanied by propaganda delivered via radio, television, the internet and other mediums, along with unspecified ‘psychological warfare weapons’ that aim to distract and weaken the Taiwanese military’s morale and crumble their will to fight.”
A range of military options is open to China. Examples include decapitation strikes (i.e. assassinating leaders), psychological warfare attacks via the internet, TV and radio to demoralize, an initial wave of missile strikes, special forces infiltration, clandestine troop build-ups, and secretly loading equipment onto vessels.
Limitations in amphibious capacity has led Blasko to highlight the role that army aviation and special forces could play in any invasion of Taiwan. The PLA has 15 army aviation brigades with perhaps 1,000-1,500 helicopters. By moving 4-5 aviation brigades into the area across from Taiwan, perhaps 700-800 helicopters could be mustered for an assault. In one of two days, these could perhaps land 10,000 troops behind the coast to attack airports and ports,” he suggested.
Furthermore, the PLAAF’s Airborne Corps of approximately 30,000 troops, plus its air-droppable armored vehicles, could play an important role against Taiwan.
Blasko concluded, “That’s one of the things I don’t see spoken about enough right now. I’m thinking that the whole across-the-beach invasion is what people are focused on, when China now has the capability to come in behind.” A significant amount of air assault, special operations and airborne troops could cause havoc for Taiwanese defenders. Furthermore, light, mobile units make better sense in any invasion scenario, since Taiwan’s terrain is unfavorable for heavy armor. Easton noted: “PLA strategists caution that stratagem will only take the amphibious commander so far. No matter how great the deception and the surprise, at a certain moment the assault forces will be exposed and they will require massive covering fires with air, naval and rocket force assets. In addition to concealment, whether or not one can effectively organize and carry out cover [fires] during the crossing has decisive meaning for the safety of the landing forces, ensuring they can get across.
The desire for surprise will probably not override all other considerations, and PLA doctrine prefers to have mass and numerical superiority on its side. Yet, if their writings are any indication, Chinese military strategists never doubt the value of surprise.”
Of course, the USA does not have any troops stationed on Taiwan, and its force posture relies on accurate warning intelligence for protection. A surprise Chinese attack would therefore stymy any American response.
Easton concluded: “Optimistic judgments concerning the number of days or even weeks of advanced war warning that will be available in a Taiwan invasion scenario deserve scrutiny in light of Xi Jinping’s strong interest in stratagem. The PLA’s writings, traditions, historical behavior, force developments and contemporary practices all point in the same direction. Experts on deception credit CCP strategists with skills surpassing their former counterparts in the Soviet Union.” (ANI)
Disclaimer: This story is auto-generated from a syndicated feed of ANI; only the image & headline may have been reworked by News Services Division of World News Network Inc Ltd and Palghar News and Pune News and World News
HINDI, MARATHI, GUJARATI, TAMIL, TELUGU, BENGALI, KANNADA, ORIYA, PUNJABI, URDU, MALAYALAM
For more details and packages
